Starting in the mid 1970s, Chile implemented a deep and comprehensive set of structural market reforms. In spite of the wide agreement there is with respect to the expected benefits these reforms should have on growth, little evidence has been provided to empirically establish and to quantify this connection. Using plant-level data on Chilean manufacturing firms for the 1980-2001 period, we provide such evidence. In particular, we estimate disaggregate total factor productivity (TFP) and decompose its dynamics into production reallocation and within plant efficiency changes to study aggregate efficiency, a fundamental source of aggregate growth. We find that during the 1990s, when most reforms had already been fully implemented, both the level and dispersion of TFP grew steadily. These efficiency gains were explained in equal proportions by within plant changes and by the net entry of new and more productive economic units. The reallocation among incumbent plants did not contribute significantly to the enhancement of efficiency, however. Finally, we also show that within-plant efficiency gains were the largest among firms producing traded goods, and among firms that were more likely to face binding liquidity constraints. Thus, in Chile, the adoption of better technologies and production processes, fostered by broader foreign exposure and a superior access to external finance, seem to have accounted for the observed improvement in manufacturing performance.
Introduction
Since the mid 1970s, Chile implemented a deep and comprehensive set of structural market reforms. The main goal of these reforms was to increase the role of markets and the participation of the private sector in the economy.
The results speak for themselves. Chile's outstanding macroeconomic performance during most of the last two decades has been portrayed as an example of successful marketoriented policies. And although these decades have not been free of turbulence, at the end, Chile has developed into a stable emerging economy that has clearly outperformed the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean. Although favorable external conditions contributed to achieve this rapid growth, its main source was a remarkable increase in total factor productivity (TFP). In fact, since 1980, almost 90% of total growth is explained by efficiency gains. 1 The response of the economy to reforms at the macroeconomic level reflects substantial changes in the industrial organization of domestic markets, as well as the process of adaptation of individual firms to a new and more dynamic environment. In fact, as this paper shows, plant dynamics --the entry and exit of economic units, and within plant efficiency gains--explain a substantial part of the observed aggregate efficiency gains. Thus, to better understand the link between market reforms and growth, we must understand the link between these reforms, plant dynamics, and efficiency gains.
Surprisingly, in spite of the broad agreement on the importance of market reforms in explaining high and sustained growth in Chile over the past two decades, little empirical evidence has been provided to establish and quantify this connection. Using plant-level data on Chilean manufacturing firms for the 1980-2001 period, we provide such evidence. To do so, we estimate and characterize plant-specific total factor productivity and use these estimates to study the microeconomic sources of aggregate efficiency. To capture the link between reforms and aggregate efficiency, we separate our sample into two sub-periods: the 1980s (1980-1989) and the 1990s (1990-2001) . The former represents a period over which most reforms were being enacted and implemented; the latter is a period when the effects on the economy were fully manifested.
The Chilean experience is particularly interesting for several reasons: First, the reforms were deep and affected all key markets. Among other reforms, public firms were privatized, most trade impediments were lifted, labor markets were flexibilized, the financial system was liberalized, and individual accounts for social security were created. Second, the available micro data encompasses a long period of time, including part of the enactment and implementation of the reforms and over a decade of their aftermath. The long period that has passed since most reforms were implemented should allow us to capture their full effects. Finally, although most reforms were implemented at once, the 1982-83 deep recession led authorities to reverse some of these policies. Other papers analyzing the Chilean experience have used data between 1980 and 1986 (Pavcnik (2002 , for instance), and have incorrectly assumed that the Chilean economy was far more open in the mid 1980s than in the early 1980s. This is not the case as, for instance, the mean tariff reached 35% by mid 1985, whereas in 1980 it was only 10%.
Our results support a quantitatively relevant connection between market reforms and efficiency gains in Chile. In fact, by decomposing productivity dynamics into production reallocation and within plant efficiency changes, we find that during the 1990s, when most reforms had already been fully implemented, both the level and dispersion of TFP grew steadily. These results hold for all, entrants, exiting, and incumbent firms. These 1990s aggregate efficiency gains are explained in equal proportions by within plant changes and the net entry of new and more productive economic units. The reallocation among incumbent firms did not contribute significantly to the enhancement of efficiency, however. Once the reforms were fully in place, the gains from the allocation of inputs and output became less important.
We also analyze the behavior of within-plant efficiency gains. At the extensive margin, we find that although newly created firms display lower productivity than incumbents at the beginning, entering survivors quickly improve their productivity. After one period only, the productivity of a new plant is statistically equal to that of an incumbent. Moreover, exiting plants experience a downward trajectory of productivity prior to exit. Thus, inefficient plants are replaced by firms that are more efficient and that experience rapid improvements in productivity. That is, turnover leads to aggregate efficiency gains. All these patterns are strengthened during the 1990s in comparison with the 1980s.
How do these idiosyncratic efficiency gains respond to specific market reforms? In this paper we look at the role of trade liberalization and financial market reforms in plant dynamics. To study the effects of trade, we classify plants according to the trade orientation of the sector they belong to at the 3-digit ISIC level. The results show that firms producing tradable goods are many times more productive than firms producing non-tradable goods. Again, this productivity advantage of firms in traded sectors increased further in the 1990s, indicating that the fall in trade costs from the bilateral agreements that followed post 1990 is associated with additional productivity gains. These findings suggest that plants did respond to intensified foreign competition, either through the selection of the best producers, or through within plants productivity enhancements. Possibly the latter is a result of the reduced cost of foreign capital and intermediate materials, and the better functioning of financial markets.
After the 1982-83 crisis, and the implementation of a tax and a social security reform that strongly promoted savings, Chile experienced an investment boom, with financial market deepening and foreign finance expansion. To explore the role of the development of financial markets on plant efficiency we identify plants that are more likely to be credit constrained. Specifically, we use their ownership status --for instance, whether they are individually owned or stock corporations--as an indicator of their likelihood of credit restrictions. The results show that individually owned plants are less productive than limited liability corporations and stock corporations. However, the productivity of individually owned plants increased much faster in the 1990s as the financial market deepened. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that firms that are credit constrained experienced the largest gains from financial market development.
In short, the exposure to foreign markets and the higher access to external finance have been key to foster aggregate efficiency gains in Chile. These TFP increases have resulted mostly from the adoption of better technologies and production processes, both by new firms and incumbents.
The policy implication derived from this paper is clear: exposing firms to the best practices -for instance through market oriented policies --is key to generate conditions that promote aggregate growth. On the opposite side, rigidities that block plant dynamics, especially through altering the natural process of birth, expansion, and death of plants impede growth and limit development.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the main structural reforms implemented in Chile since the mid 1970s and its macroeconomic performance afterwards. In Section 3 we present the manufacturing data used and we characterize plant-level TFP. In Section 4 we study and quantify the role of market oriented policies in the process of efficiency enhancing plant-dynamics. The final section concludes.
Market reforms in Chile: An overview
Today, few question the significance of the structural reforms initiated in the mid 1970s in shaping the economic transformation of Chile over the past few decades. 2 The scenario was very different thirty years ago, however. By the late 1960s, trade restrictions had practically isolated the Chilean economy from the rest of the world. The structure of relative prices was drastically distorted in favor of industrial goods at the expense of agricultural, mining and other tradable activities. Differential import duties exempted capital goods and levied high taxes on final goods, creating a largely inefficient capital-intensive industrial sector. For instance, import tariffs ranged from 0 percent for capital goods to 750 percent for luxury goods. There was also a requirement of a 90-day non-interest bearing deposit of 10,000 percent of the CIF value of imported goods and all import operations were required administrative approval. In addition, a system of multiple exchange rates prevailed reaching, at the collapse of the economy in 1973, a 52 to 1 ratio.
The few imports that resulted were concentrated on intermediate goods, followed by capital goods, and some "essential" consumer goods. Exports were mostly concentrated on copper, making the trade balance highly dependent on the evolution of copper prices. Moreover, several foreign mining companies, banks, and enterprises had been nationalized.
In short, the military government that took power in September 1973 inherited an economy closed to international trade, dominated by the public sector, with severe macroeconomic imbalances, in the form of accelerating inflation and a deteriorating balance of payments. Relative prices were starkly distorted and the production and distribution of goods was mainly determined by bureaucratic rules. The labor market was dominated by a few unions, which were fighting for political rather than for workers' objectives. The country had practically no foreign exchange reserves and the budget reached a deficit of 25% of GDP.
Since the very beginning, the new military government implemented far-ranging promarket reforms. The initial set of trade reforms was intended to simplify the structure of the economy. Consistently, exchange markets were unified and all restrictions to trade other than tariffs were removed immediately, while tariffs were reduced from an average of 94% in 1973 to a uniform rate of 10% by 1979. Price ceilings and public purchasing mechanisms were also eliminated, and the state withdrew from most parts of the economy, including labor relations, international economic relations, and social services.
Initial reforms contemplated nine main areas: (1) a stabilization program to reduce an increasing inflation; (2) the liberalization of markets in an effort to get the price system back in operation; (3) public sector reforms to reach macroeconomic stability and to improve the efficiency of the public sector and of the economy as a whole; (4) trade reforms to provide appropriate incentives to export oriented and import competing activities; (5) a social security reform to change from a pay-as-you go pension system into one based on individual capitalization; (6) a financial sector reform to improve the efficiency of financial intermediation; (7) a labor market reform to facilitate the industrial restructuring and the drastic reallocation of labor that had to take place from the highly protected import competing sectors towards the export oriented activities; (8) a comprehensive privatization program; and (9) social sector reforms to improve incentives in the production and provision of social services.
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Early on, the economy recovered at high speed: during the 1976-80 period GDP grew at an average rate of 7% and the availability of foreign goods expanded markedly. However, and although reforms continued advancing in several fronts, two major problems remained unsolved: unemployment levels did not decline in a significant manner, and inflation remained stubbornly high. Among the instruments used to control inflation, the fixing of the nominal exchange rate in June 1979 proved to have a devastating effect. The highly indexed nature of the Chilean economy, in combination with the fixed exchange rate, induced an increasing real exchange rate overvaluation, fostering imports and discouraging exports, and leading to large current account deficits. In 1981, the external deficit reached 14.5% of GDP. Large amounts of foreign loans entered the country to finance the trade imbalance and, as a consequence, the foreign debt skyrocketed from 1977 to 1981. Two additional elements also helped generating the observed rise in the level of indebtedness: the resistance of the real interest rate to converge to world levels, and the deregulation of the financial market in 1981. The former induced a continuous flow of short-term lending; the lack of adequate supervision of the quality of the portfolio of banks due to the latter, led to a generalized miscalculation of risk levels and imprudent domestic lending (Barandiarán and Hernández, 1999 ).
With such a large trade imbalance, confidence on the Chilean economy faltered and foreign lending ceased. In June 1982 the authorities were forced to devalue the peso by 19%, but "it was too little, and too late" (Cox-Edwards and Edwards, 1991) . The economy fell in a deep recession as GDP dropped by 13.4% in 1982 and a further 3.5% in 1983; unemployment, already high, swelled to 34% of the labor force (including emergency employment programs), and the government deficit increased to almost 9% of GDP when the Central Bank had to rescue the financial sector from bankruptcy. Foreign debt reached 130% of GDP in 1983.
This recession led authorities to partially reverse the openness policies. In particular, the mean tariff was raised, and reached a level of 35% in 1984 and 1985. Since then, however, the reduction in tariffs continued. In 1990, with the return to democracy, the commitment to openness was not altered. As a matter of fact, average tariffs continued to be reduced in a gradual manner from around 15% in 1988 to 4% in 2004.
Starting in 1985, the government went through a second round of privatizations that included public utility firms and several financial companies that had been taken over in the 1982 financial collapse. In 1986 a new banking law was implemented. In short, during the second half of the 1980s the financial system was rebuilt and a greater supervisory role for the Central Bank was established. Chile also introduced some innovative debt conversion schemes to reduce its foreign debt by approximately 50%.
In 1990, and after 17 years of a military regime, elections were held and the candidate of a center-left coalition was elected. Immediately after the new president was in power, the commercial links with the rest of the world were strengthened. For instance, until then trade liberalization had been implemented unilaterally; since 1990, multilateral agreements were initiated. Similarly, capital inflows increased as foreign investment decisions were determined by market conditions. Evidently, the 1990s mark the consolidation of a market economy drastically transformed during the previous 15 years.
Since the beginning, the democratic governments maintained a strong fiscal stance and the Central Bank of Chile -independent since 1989 -gradually reduced inflation to the lowest level in half a century. Public spending on social programs increased sharply. Structural reforms proceeded at a much slower pace, however, with gradual progress recorded in areas of trade reform. Today, Chile maintains trade agreements with most economies in the world, covering more than 95% of its exports.
Summing up, only during the late 1980s and early 1990s the Chilean economy fully reaped the benefits from the changes in economic incentives and productive structure that came with trade reforms. By the end of the 1990s, Chile had unquestionably been the Latin American country with the most consistent record over the last two decades. The sound and stable behavior of most macroeconomic indicators, and the sharp improvement in social indices catapult Chile as the most successful recent experience in the region. In fact, the 1990s were much more stable than the 1980s, in spite of the Tequila and the Asian crises.
For instance, the volatility of detrended GDP was 5.8% during the 1970s, 5% during the 1980s, and only 2.1% during the 1990s.
In the next section, we describe the data used in this study and we estimate and characterize our measures of plant-level TFP. We then discuss the connection between these efficiency dynamics and market reforms. To do so, we separate our sample in two sub-periods, the 1980s and the 1990s. This division is intended to establish a pre and post completion of reforms period, capturing the full effect of these policies. Two reasons support this otherwise arbitrary dissection of our data sample. First and as previously described, these policies were mostly implemented during the mid 1970s and early 1980s. As a result of the 1982-83 crisis, however, some policies were partially reverted. Pro-market policies were retaken only in 1985. Since then, tariffs were continuously reduced, a new banking legislation was implemented in 1986, and the Central Bank became independent in 1989. Moreover, firms required time to adjust to new economic conditions. With this lag we intend to fully capture the plant dynamics that resulted from these reforms. Second, in 1990 and after 17 years of a military regime, a newly democratically elected government took office. Only then were foreign investment decisions fully determined by market conditions and not by political considerations. 
Plant dynamics and aggregate TFP
Two sources of productivity gains drive aggregate efficiency over time: the exposure of economic units to better methods of production (within-plant efficiency gains), and the Schumpeterian creative destruction process through which efficient firms thrive while inefficient ones disappear (reallocation driven efficiency gains). The former is the result of the adoption of new and better technologies and the implementation of more efficient production processes within incumbents; the latter, results from the reshuffling of resources from less to more productive firms and the entry process of new and more efficient firms that replace old and less efficient ones. A number of papers report evidence for developed and developing economies on the importance of plant dynamics in accounting for aggregate efficiency gains.
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This virtuous process of reallocation, technology adoption and efficiency gains should be directly linked to market reforms. Two recently available regularities support this prior: First, the research based on plant-level data shows that productivity is highly heterogeneous across units, even within narrowly defined sectors at any given period of time. This heterogeneity is a necessary condition for the reallocation of inputs and output to be a relevant source of productivity gains and aggregate growth. Second, the data also show that vintage is an important factor in explaining productivity gaps. Thus, the entry of new firms with better technologies and more efficient production processes is also an important source of TFP gains. Therefore, market reforms, as they promote this entry-exit process, induce the adoption of more efficient production techniques, and facilitate an efficient allocation of 4 See Labán and Larraín (1994) . 5 See Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for a recent review of the literature. resources, may be key to explain why some economies prosper while others stagnate. In the following section we show that, at least for Chile, this has indeed been the case.
The data and estimation of plant-level TFPs
The data in this study come from the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (ENIA), an annual survey of manufacturing conducted by the Chilean statistics agency, the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE). The ENIA covers all manufacturing plants that employ at least ten individuals. Thus, it includes all newly created and continuing plants with ten or more employees, and it excludes plants that ceased activities or reduced their hiring below the survey's threshold. 6 The ENIA collects detailed information on plant characteristics, such as manufacturing sub-sector at the 4-digit ISIC level, sales, employment, investment, intermediate inputs, and location. The available data cover the 1980-2001 period.
Unfortunately, the ENIA does not report plant-level output prices, so we constructed deflators at the 3-digit level from INE's wholesale price indices. The use of a common industry-level deflator might be problematic, as within-industry price differences are imputed as productivity shocks.
7 Nominal output was thus deflated using these 3-digit level price indices. Deflators for materials were also constructed at the 3-digit ISIC level, using the 1996 input-output table. All real variables are expressed in 1992 Chilean pesos. Capital series were constructed using information on investment and depreciation (Bergoeing, Hernando and Repetto, 2005) .
We estimate production functions and plant-level TFP using the strategy developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and further extended by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) . We excluded the tobacco industry (314) and petroleum refineries (353) from the analysis, because they are organized as monopolies, operating with very few plants. The estimation strategy of Olley and Pakes assumes that plant specific shocks are technology driven, and thus rules out markup shocks. Syverson (2004) shows that the failure of this assumption invalidates the strategy we use. That is, if a plant faces a positive markup shock, the procedure assumes that this high measured productivity is due to shifts in efficiency. After the exclusion of these two sectors, we are left with 27 3-digit ISIC sub-sectors that account for 92% of total real gross revenue in the ENIA.
We also excluded plants that report either no employment or no blue-collar workers, and plants that report zero wages, no production days, zero gross production value, negative value added, gross production value lower then value added, exports that are larger than total sales, or no ISIC code. At the end, our estimates are thus based on over 80 thousand observations on more than 10 thousand manufacturing plants. Table 1 presents the main descriptive statistics of our sample in the 1980s and 1990s. The table shows that both gross output and input usage (all measured in natural logs) increased between these two decades. Moreover, the table shows that plant level inputs and output also experienced a rise in dispersion. Finally, the table reports entry rates --the percentage of firms that are new in the sample--of 4.54% and 7.84% in the pre and post 1990 periods, respectively. Similarly, the exit rates --the percentage of firms that leave the sample--also increased, although less, from 6.86% to 7.82%.
To construct series of TFP we estimated revenue production functions at the three-digit level using skilled and unskilled (blue-collar) labor, capital, materials, and energy as inputs. As an already large body of literature has pointed out, the empirical estimation of production functions is problematic because productivity, a state variable in the firm's decision problem, is not observed by the econometrician. Moreover, instrumental variables are needed to disentangle the variation due to idiosyncratic technology shocks, input price differences and plant specific demand shifts. Unfortunately, we do not observe plant level output prices, so we cannot follow the strategy proposed by Shea (1993) and Syverson (2004) . Instead we use the estimation procedure developed by Olley and Pakes (OP) and modified by Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) . 8 We use electricity demand as the proxy for productivity in the OP-LP estimation procedure.
9 Table 2 presents the estimated elasticities of unskilled and skilled labor, capital, materials and electricity. The reported elasticities exhibit wide variation across sectors. Most coefficients are precisely estimated. Only capital cannot be precisely estimated in a number of sectors, perhaps due to its little time variability, a result of investment's lumpy behavior. In about 75% of sectors, the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale cannot be rejected. The estimated degrees of returns to scale vary from 0.77 (chemical industry) to 1.77 (iron and steel basic industries). The largest elasticity of unskilled labor corresponds to the manufacturing of china, pottery and earthenware, with a point elasticity of 0.30. The most skilled-labor elastic sector is the manufacture of glass products, with an elasticity of 0.26. The statistically significant coefficients on capital vary between 0.09 (food products) and 0.98 (iron and steel basic industries).
Characterizing aggregate productivity
We estimate total factor productivity for each plant as the residual from the estimated production functions presented in Table 2 . A similar evolution was followed by TFP dispersion, measured as the difference between the 90 th and 10 th percentiles. The figure shows that there is wide dispersion in TFP across plants at any given year. Calculations for specific three digits sectors show a consistent pattern. These large differences in productivity are a necessary condition for reallocation to be a quantitatively relevant source of efficiency gains. Additionally, the figure shows a substantial increase in the dispersion of TFP in spite of the reduction in aggregate volatility in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. At the beginning of the sample period, our heterogeneity measure was equal to 0.77. By the end of the period, it reached a level of 0.90. This higher relative heterogeneity during the 1990s may reflect a higher degree of flexibility due to the full implementation of market reforms a decade earlier. Figure 2 plots the evolution of the simple and weighted average TFP, using the share of plant's output out of total output in a given year as weights. This weighted measure has been extensively used in the literature in order to capture the aggregate productivity gains due to the allocation of activity (Foster et al., 1998) . Olley and Pakes (1996) decompose this weighted average into the simple average and a covariance term between market shares and TFP. In other words, if the most efficient firms have the largest market shares, then the allocation of inputs and output is efficiency enhancing. If so, the weighted average reaches a higher level than the simple average, as the distance between the measures in Figure 2 represents the covariance term. The figure shows that, except for 1995, in Chile the weighted measure is always above the simple average. Thus the data show that indeed the correlation between market shares and TFP is positive --except for 1995 --and that production is disproportionately located at the most efficient plants.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that aggregate productivity is mostly accounted for by the simple average, and not by the allocation term. Foster et al. (1998) find similar results for the US. In contrast, Eslava et al. (2004) find that the contribution of the covariance term accounts for almost all aggregate productivity in Colombia. Moreover, the contribution of the covariance term is larger at the beginning of our sample period, reaching a maximum of 9.9% in 1985. Our results imply thus that it is average productivity that underlies the increase in productivity observed in the Chilean manufacturing sector, particularly after 1990. After a large number of distortionary policies that placed impediments on reallocation were removed, the allocation of resources among incumbent producers lost relative importance over time. The general adoption of better techniques seems to account for the improved industry performance.
Market reforms and productivity gains: The Chilean evidence
In this section we show that the exposure to foreign markets and a higher access to external finance have fostered aggregate efficiency gains in Chile. These TFP increases have resulted mostly from the adoption of better technologies and production processes, both by new firms and incumbents.
Entry and exit effects
The cross-sectional decomposition of TFP into the simple average and the covariance term, and the analysis of aggregates omit the role of plant entry and exit. In this section we analyze the relative efficiency of newly created plants and shutdowns.
There exists a vast theoretical literature on firm heterogeneity pioneered by Jovanovic (1982) and further extended by Hopenhayn (1992) , Ericson and Pakes (1995) , Campbell (1998), and Bergoeing et al. (2004) . These models are characterized by heterogeneous production units, vintage capital, common and idiosyncratic shocks, and an ongoing process of plant entry and exit. Plants exit if aggregate economic prospects loom negative. Plants may also exit if their current technology becomes obsolete. Thus plants with relatively low level of technology are scrapped. New units enter embodying inputs and production processes that reflect the leading edge technology. However, new firms are uncertain with respect to their own idiosyncratic efficiency, and thus may enter and quickly leave the market after this uncertainty is resolved. Table 3 reports regressions of plant level TFP accounting for entry and exit effects. The entry dummy is equal to one in period t if the plant produced in year t but not in any previous period. Similarly, the exit dummy is equal to one in period t if the plant produced in year t but not in any period ahead. The first column shows that, relative to incumbents, the typical entering and exiting plants are less productive. Still, newly created firms have a productivity advantage over shutdowns.
The second column of Table 3 explores the pre and post 1990 behavior of plant level TFP according to the plant's market status. In order to do so, we included a post-1990 dummy that is equal to one in years 1990-2001, and zero otherwise. We also interacted this dummy with the entry and exit dummies. The results confirm our previous finding that the 1990s are characterized by higher efficiency levels than the 1980s. The results also indicate that even firms that enter and exit the market display higher TFP after 1990. Still newly created firms display lower productivity than incumbents, contrary to the predictions of vintage capital models.
10 Nevertheless, the productivity advantage of entering plants relative to shutdowns widened after 1990.
The third and fourth columns of the table explore the dynamics of productivity post entry and prior to exit. Does the productivity of firms that enter increase over time? Are there learning effects? Similarly, does the efficiency of exiting plants deteriorate before they actually exit? That is, is there evidence of the "shadow of death" effect (Griliches and Regev, 1995) ? To explore the evolution of exiting firms' productivity we added one and two period leads of the exit dummy to our specification. Similarly, to account for learning effects we added one and two period lags of the entry dummy. The results reported on column (3) suggest that exiting plants experience a downward trajectory of productivity prior to exit. Several studies have reported similar results for other countries. 11 The results also suggest that entering survivors quickly improve their productivity. After one period only, the productivity of a new plant is statistically equal to that of an incumbent. These patterns imply that inefficient plants are replaced by firms that are more efficient, and that experience rapid improvements in productivity. Thus turnover leads to aggregate efficiency gains.
Finally, we explore whether these learning and shadow of death effects experienced a change between the 1980s and 1990s. On the one hand, there is a sharp contrast between the pre and post 1990 evolution of entering firms' productivity. According to our estimation results, plant's productivity improved after entry in both periods. But only in the 1990s they were able to quickly catch up with incumbents. Moreover, the average entrant was relatively much more productive in the 1990s than in the 1980s. On the other hand, the dynamic pattern of exiting plants' TFP is similar in both periods, with lower relative productivity in the 1980s. Overall, the average entering firm gains more efficiency in the 1990s than the average exiting firm.
Next we look further into the hypothesis that plants with relatively low level of technology are more likely to exit. Table 4 reports the marginal effects of productivity and employment (as a proxy for size) on the likelihood of plant exit. We measure productivity as the distance between the plant's specific productivity and the annual average TFP at the sector level.
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The first column shows that larger and more efficient plants are indeed less likely to fail.
If the reforms made the economy more competitive, then all plants should be more likely to exit. This is exactly what our regression results on column (2) show: before 1990, having one extra point of productivity reduced the probability of exit in 2.6 percentage points. After 1990, this advantage had reduced to 1.3 percentage points. Similar results are found for the effect of firm size.
Our results imply that after 1990 turnover was higher, and had a larger "cleansing" effect, pushing the least productive plants to exit. It is likely the case that firms had a better access to credit markets, and greater flexibility to enter the market, experiment and learn about the efficiency and profitability of their investments. This flexibility and the increased competition also led firms to exit more quickly the market after 1990.
The effects of trade reforms on plant-level efficiency
Trade liberalization might enhance plant and aggregate productivity through different channels. First, trade liberalization exposes domestic firms to foreign competition, reducing their market power and forcing them to improve their efficiency in order to ensure survival. Second, if there are domestic and foreign market entry costs, the least efficient plants shutdown, whereas only the most productive plants are able to successfully export. 13 Trade also facilitates the access to foreign technology and reduces the cost of foreign intermediate 12 The table reports the marginal effects of a probit regression of the exit dummy on the measure of productivity, log employment, and a full set of year and sector dummies. 13 See Eaton and Kortum (2002) , Melitz (2003) , and Bernard et al. (2004) for recent models of trade with heterogeneous firms. and capital goods. In this section we explore the effects on plant level productivity dynamics.
To identify the effects of trade liberalization on plants, we classify them according to the trade orientation of the sector they belong to at the 3-digit ISIC level. Compared to firms in non-traded goods sectors, firms in export-oriented and import-competing sectors are exposed to the competition of foreign firms, and thus must be more efficient in order to survive. All plants, though, are benefited by the reduced cost of foreign inputs.
We use the sector classification of Hernando (2001) , based on Campa and Goldberg (1995) . According to this strategy, sectors can be classified depending upon their export intensity of sales and the volume of imported competing goods. A sector is non-traded if (1) the export share in total sales is lower than 10% and import penetration does not exceed 6%, or (2) import penetration is lower than 10% and the export share does not exceed 6%. A sector is export-oriented if the export intensity of sales is larger than 10%. A sector is import competing if import penetration exceeds 20%. Using data for 1986 , Hernando (2001 finds that export oriented sectors are those related to natural resources, such as the manufacturing of paper, chemicals, food processing, and beverages. The sectors classified as import-competing are those that are labor intensive, such as textiles and leather industries. Also, the manufacture of machinery is classified as import competing. Sectors that switch their classification over the analyzed period were excluded from the analysis. Finally, some sectors are both import competing and export-oriented, so we call them "other tradables". We generate a set of dummies indicating the trade orientation status of the each plant's sector.
OLS and fixed effects regressions clearly show that firms producing tradable goods are many times more productive than plants producing non-traded goods (Table 5, first two  columns). 14 Interestingly, this productivity advantage of tradables increased further in the 1990s, indicating that the fall in trade costs from the bilateral agreements that followed post 1990 is associated with additional productivity gains (third and fourth columns). These findings suggest that plants did respond to intensified foreign competition, either through the selection of the best producers, or through within plants productivity enhancements. Possibly the latter is a result of the reduced cost of foreign capital and intermediate materials, and the better functioning of financial markets.
The role of financial markets development
Poorly functioning financial markets limit the creation of new firms as they lack the necessary funds for project finance. Similarly, credit constrained incumbents face limits to their ability to adopt the latest technology vintages, retool, and grow.
Chile experienced an investment boom, associated to the deepening of financial markets, the entry of foreign finance, the privatization of the public pension system, and a tax reform that promoted firm saving. 15 In this section we explore the effects of the development of financial markets on within plant efficiency. Plants that were credit constrained are those that are more likely to gain when financial markets get deeper, as they lack enough external funds to finance profitable projects.
To identify these effects, we divide firms into those that are more and less likely to face financing constraints and then compare the efficiency behavior of these two over time. Specifically, we use their ownership status as an indicator of their likelihood of credit constraints. Firms that are individually owned have lower access to external finance than limited liability corporations, and particularly to stock corporations. 16 So we construct dummy variables that indicate the ownership status of the plant.
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The regression results presented in Table 6 show that individually owned plants are less productive than other plants. These plants are typically smaller, less likely to export, and more likely to shutdown than the rest of the firms. However, the productivity of these firms increased much faster in the 1990s as the financial market deepened. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that firms that are credit constrained experienced the largest gains from financial market deepening. In an economy with poorly developed credit markets, actual firms and potential entrants with productive investment projects are unable to raise sufficient external funds to undertake these projects at the efficient levels. By allowing a better access to financial markets, these investment activities have a better likelihood of being implemented, and to result in an improvement in plant productivity.
The Sources of Aggregate TFP gains
So far we have analyzed the behavior of within-plant efficiency over the 1980s and 1990s. We now explore the behavior of aggregate TFP, using the weighted average previously presented as our measure of aggregate efficiency. In particular we disentangle aggregate productivity dynamics into the changes in efficiency within firms, and the reallocation arising from the expansion and contraction of continuing plants as well as from the entry and exit of economic units.
Specifically, we follow Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (1998) in decomposing productivity growth into four elements: (i) a within-plant effect, given by incumbents' productivity growth weighted by initial output shares; (ii) a reallocation effect, that captures the gains in aggregate productivity coming from the expanding market share of high productivity plants relative to the initial aggregate productivity level; (iii) an entry effect which is the sum of the differences between each entering plant's productivity and initial aggregate productivity, weighted by its market share; and (iv) an exit effect given by the sum of the differences between each exiting plant's productivity and initial aggregate productivity, weighted by its market share. 18 The decomposition is given by:
where ∆ refers to changes over the k-year interval; P s is the log aggregate productivity level in year s; p it is plant's i efficiency in year t; θ it is its output share in total output at time t, and C, N, and X are sets of continuing, entering, and exiting plants, respectively. Thus, incumbents contribute to aggregate log productivity growth if they become more efficient, or if the more productive plants increase their market share. New plants contribute positively to productivity growth if they have higher productivity than the initial industry average. Exiting plants contribute if they have lower productivity than the initial industry average. The last three terms of the decomposition capture the effects of heterogeneity. If all plants were identical, then the within effect would constitute the only source of aggregate gains. Table 7 displays our decomposition results for the pre and post 1990 periods. Aggregate gains in the 1990s are three times as large as the gains of the 1980s. In both, within-plant productivity improvements generate a large fraction of total gains. However, the contribution of within-plant efficiency was much larger in the 1980s. In the post 1990 period, entry becomes the most important source of aggregate gains. The contribution of reallocation across continuing firms is always small. Finally, the exit term is positive in both periods, in an apparent contradiction with our previous result that the average exiting firm has low relative productivity: when the productivity differential is weighted by the initial market shares, the exit term becomes positive.
We repeated this decomposition for every sector at the 3-digit ISIC level, and then correlated the resulting components of TFP growth with the trade-orientation and post-1990 dummies created previously. Table 8 reports our regression results. The aggregate TFP of export oriented and other tradable sectors grew much faster than their non-traded and import-competing counterparts in the post-1990 period. Within effects represent a statistically significant source of the rising aggregate TFP growth observed over the past decade in both these sectors. Entry is relevant among export-oriented sectors, whereas other tradable industries gain efficiency through incumbents´ resource reallocation in the post-1990 period relative to non-tradable sectors. Although not always statistically significant, exit in the post-1990 period has a negative coefficient, this time indicating that even after 18 There exist several alternative decomposition methods that follow this tradition. See Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (1998) for further discussion.
productivities are weighted by market shares, exiting firms display lower productivity than average, and thus contributing to aggregate TFP growth.
These results are consistent with those presented previously. First, the allocation of activity among incumbents contributes a relatively small fraction of aggregate productivity, with a decreasing importance over the past few decades. Second, entering firms improve quickly their productivity, especially in the 1990s, contributing positively to aggregate efficiency growth. Finally, the relative importance of these effects depends crucially upon the level of competition plants face. When trading costs fall and foreign market competition rises, firms exposed to trade have relatively more incentives for productivity enhancement, whereas the least productive firms are forced to exit the market. The cost of production also falls as imported inputs and materials become less expensive; thus all firms are able to improve their efficiency. Overall our results suggest that falling trade costs do account for the rising TFP growth in Chile over time.
Concluding remarks
The Chilean experience provides clear evidence on the contribution of market reforms on efficiency gains. During the last two decades, and after most reforms were fully implemented, the increase in TFP has been explained in equal proportions by within plant changes and the net entry of new and more productive economic units. The reallocation among incumbent firms, however, has not contributed significantly to the enhancement of efficiency. In Chile, the adoption of better technologies and production processes, fostered by broader foreign exposure and a superior access to external finance seem to have accounted for the observed improvement in industry performance. 1980-1989 1990-2001 1980-1989 1990- 
